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  Bilateral and regional safeguard mechanisms in free trade agreements (FTAs) 
address only the effects of trade liberalization initiatives under FTAs, and thus, in 
contrast with other trade remedies such as antidumping, they enable the examination 
of their nature and preferability to free trade independently of the global. We 
investigated selected bilateral and regional safeguard mechanisms according to nine 
different indicators, which represent the “conditions for invocation,” “conditions of 
application,” and “procedural conditions” for the safeguard measures. While the 
safeguard mechanisms reveal specific characteristics according to their political and 
economic backgrounds, their nature is approximately summarized in the following 
order of preferability: (1) No Safeguard Type, (2) WTO Type, (3) NAFTA Type, (4) GATT 
Type, and (5) European Type. Importantly, however, in the overall understanding of 
the significance of each safeguard mechanism, one needs to be reminded of their trade 
liberalization (“safety valve”) functions. In that sense, any final remarks on the subject 
can come only after assessing the level of trade liberalization facilitated by the 






This paper aims to investigate the treatment of bilateral and regional 
safeguard mechanisms in selected free trade agreements1, and to some extent evaluate 
and rank them according to their preferability for the achievement of freer 
international trade. The primary safeguard mechanism in the international trading 
system is, of course, the global safeguard mechanism, which was originally introduced 
under GATT 19 and later succeeded by the package of GATT 19 and the WTO 
Safeguard Agreement2.  
On the other hand, most free trade agreements concluded in recent years 
provide special and different safeguard mechanisms which share the same or similar 
grounds for the invocation of trade-restrictive measures as the global safeguard 
mechanism, but only address the effects of certain bilateral or regional free trade 
agreements, and are thus only applicable between the contracting parties or among the 
member countries of such bilateral or regional agreements. These mechanisms, 
generally referred to as bilateral or regional safeguard mechanisms, exhibit 
considerable and interesting differences in their respective regulations, and are 
therefore a favorable research subject for elucidating and comparing the nature and 
background of bilateral and regional free trade agreements.   
This paper first touches on the basic idea and structure of safeguard 
mechanisms with reference to the provisions of the global safeguard mechanism under 
the GATT and the WTO, and then attempts to clarify the different characteristics of 
the global and bilateral or regional safeguard mechanisms, as well as the subsequent 
embodiments of such differences in some of their specific provisions. In the following 
                                                  
1  Investigated FTAs include, EFTA, AFTA, NAFTA, Australia- New Zealand, 
EC-Mexico, Japan-Singapore, China-ASEAN, US-Singapore, Korea-Chile, 
US-Australia, Japan-Mexico, and Korea-Singapore FTAs. 
2  The Safeguard Agreement was, among its negotiators, clearly projected to be the sole 
set of regulations concerning the application of global safeguard measures. However, 
since the former GATT 19 remained effective as part of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 after the coming into effect of the WTO, the application of 
global safeguard measures are now subjected to the provisions of both GATT 19 and 
the Safeguard Agreement.    3
section, which will constitute the body of our analysis, we will first provide nine 
different indicators with which to look into the selected bilateral and regional 
safeguard mechanisms, and explain briefly what they are and how they are important 
for the purpose of our analysis. We will then provide detailed case-by-case analysis of 
the safeguard mechanisms based on the indicators, and also present some speculative 
remarks on their specific characteristics. Subsequently, we shall attempt to categorize 
the investigated mechanisms into five groups according to their overall features, and 
then evaluate which groups of mechanism and which mechanisms among them are 
comparatively more preferable, basing such evaluations on their trade-restrictive 
qualities. Finally, we point to the possibility that safeguard mechanisms may, in fact, 
serve some positive functions rather than simply restricting trade. Consequently, we 
conclude that the evaluation based on the trade-restrictive nature of the mechanisms 
is essential, but comprises only half the overall analysis necessary for a complete and 
comprehensive understanding, by suggesting that any final remarks on the subject 
come only after assessing the level of trade liberalization facilitated by the existence of 
the respective mechanisms.   
 
1.  What Are Bilateral and Regional Safeguard Mechanisms? 
 
(1)  The Basic Idea and Structure of Safeguard Mechanisms 
The purpose of the GATT and free trade agreements, whether bilateral or 
regional, is to liberalize trade by reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers for freer 
movement of goods across borders. Safeguard mechanisms provided therein, on the 
contrary, authorize the contracting parties to take trade-restrictive measures with no 
unfair trade practices on the part of the exporting countries3, and thus, in principle, 
stand as obstacles to the effective execution of the agreements. Such an apparent 
contradiction in the existence of safeguard mechanisms is supposedly justified as 
                                                  
3  Antidumping measures and countervailing measures are, on the contrary, 
characterized as the remedies to unfair trade practices on the part of the exporting 
countries, and are thus applicable only against the products of countries responsible 
for such practices.  4
emergency measures for the purpose of remedying the negative impacts on domestic 
industries incurred by surges in imports4. For example, the initial global safeguard 
mechanism articulated in GATT 19, which to some extent provided the prototype for 
subsequent safeguard mechanisms, prescribed the grounds and framework of the 
measures by ambiguously stating: 
 
   If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by 
a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is 
being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities 
and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers 
in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party shall be 
free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary 
to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to 
withdraw or modify the concession5. 
 
  Thus, typically, a safeguard mechanism presupposes serious injury or threat 
thereof to the domestic industry of an importing country, which is, in turn, deemed to 
be brought about by a sudden increase in imports. Then, only when such 
an“exceptional situation” is considered to be existent, the importing country is allowed 
to invoke trade-restrictive measures that are otherwise prohibited under the free trade 
agreement. However, as one can easily imagine from the intensity of domestic trade 
politics, such trade-restrictive measures are, in practice, always subject to the risk of 
being abused by an importing country, thus considerably undermining the trade 
                                                  
4  However, such negative impacts on inefficient domestic industries are the natural 
consequences of trade liberalization, and the sources of efficiency gains that trade 
liberalization is aimed at. Thus, theoretically, the existence of safeguard mechanisms 
requires more elaborate academic rationales, which, in fact, have been the subject of 
longstanding controversy in the study of the global safeguard mechanism. For the 
overall descriptions of various doctrines presented in this context, see, for example, Raj 
Bhala and Kevin Kennedy, World Trade Law: The GATT-WTO System, Regional 
Agreements, and U.S. Law, Lexis Law Publishing, 1998; John H. Jackson, The World 
Trading System, 2nd ed., Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997; M. J. Trebilcock and Robert 
Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, 2nd ed., New York: Routledge, 1999. 
5 GATT  Article  19.1(a).  5
liberalization efforts conducted under the agreement. In fact, GATT 19 does not 
elaborate any further than the above provision on how the grounds for the invocation 
of such restrictive measures are determined to be existent, nor the types of measures 
and how long such measures are allowed to be applied. These eventually gave rise to 
the situation where importing countries were virtually free to invoke and maintain the 
measures to their liking 6 . On the other hand, due to the obligation of 
nondiscrimination upon the application of measures7, as well as the right of the 
affected exporting countries to suspend the application of substantially equivalent 
concessions or other obligations 8, importing countries were, in fact, subject to 
substantial economic as well as political costs. The costs invoking safeguard measures, 
combined with the lack of dispute settlement practices to judge an often-obvious GATT 
inconsistency9, contributed to the proliferation of infamous “grey-area measures,” as 
well as the severe marginalization of GATT 1910. 
  The Safeguard Agreement of the WTO, which came into effect after more than 
                                                  
6  In fact, as early as 1963, it was already suggested by the GATT Secretariat that the 
regulations of GATT 19 were too lax to secure the achievement of trade concessions, 
and are thus in need of critical review. See, GATT, L/2002, 1963, p.13. 
7  Though it was generally considered that the safeguard measures had to be applied 
non-discriminatorily, GATT 19, in fact, put forth no provisions concerning such an 
obligation and eventually gave rise to a counter-argument (see, for example, MC. E. J. 
Bronckers, Selective Safeguard Measures in Multilateral Trade Relations, Deventer, 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1995). The Safeguard Agreement 
of the WTO, on the other hand, clearly articulated that the measures be, in principle, 
applied non-discriminatorily against different sources of imports (Safeguard 
Agreement,  Article  5).   
8 GATT  Article  19.3(a). 
9  The so-called Panel proceeding was, of course, available as long as the parties agreed 
on its establishment. However, since grey-area measures were taken “voluntarily” by 
the exporting countries upon request, whether formal or informal, by the importing 
countries, there usually were no contracting parties in hope of such a proceeding. 
For the legal status of grey-area measures, see, for example, John H. Jackson, “The 
GATT Consistency of Export Restraint Arrangements,” World Economy, 11-2 (1988), 
pp.187-202; E-U. Petersman, “Gray Area Measures and the Rule of Law,” Journal of 
World Trade, 22-2 (1988), pp.23-44. 
10  It was estimated that by the year 1990, a total of 284 grey-area measures were 
confirmed to have existed (Terence P. Stewart, The GATT Uruguay Round: a 
negotiating history (1986-1992), Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1993, p.1729), 
whereas the number of the safeguard measures invoked between 1970 and 1994 
remained less than 100 (Industrial Structure Council, 2005 Report on the WTO 
Inconsistency of Trade Policies by Major Trading Partners, Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry, 2005, p.239, table 7-2).  6
20 years of scattered negotiations11, widely responded to these structural and practical 
problems of GATT 19, and provided a highly elaborate set of regulations covering a 
variety of aspects of law regarding its implementation12. The overall structure and the 
improvements of the Agreement are summarized as follows: 
  First, grounds for the invocation of measures and the framework for their 
applications are provided and better elaborated than the ambiguous regulations of 
GATT 19. For example, Article 4 of the Agreement specifically defines some of the 
conditions required for the invocation of measures, also clearly prescribing the ways of 
determining such prerequisite conditions. Furthermore, Article 11 explicitly prohibits 
the invocation of grey-area measures, preceded by Article 5 and Article 7 which 
illustrates what types of measures, what level of restrictions, and how long and how 
such measures are allowed to be applied. 
  Secondly, the Safeguard Agreement prescribes in detail the proceedings for 
the implementation of the mechanism, whether they are domestic or international 
proceedings. Article 3, for example, provides various instructions on the processes that 
domestic authorities need to follow upon determining the prerequisite conditions of the 
safeguard measures, while Article 12 elaborates the notification and consultation 
obligations required on importing countries at the various stages of investigation and 
application. Furthermore, Article 13 of the Agreement describes the surveillance task 
imposed on the Committee on Safeguards13. Article 14 clarifies that the neutral 
dispute settlement procedures of the WTO are applicable to the disputes arising from 
the Agreement. 
                                                  
11  For the details of such negotiations, see, especially, Stewart, ibid, pp.1745-1752 and 
pp.1761-1800; John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the 
Uruguay Round, 2nd and revised ed., The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999, 
pp.53-57, 168-171, 260-261. 
12  For the achievements and failures in the Safeguard Agreement, see, for example, 
John H. Jackson, The World Trading System, 2nd ed., Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997, 
pp.210-211; Thiebaut Flory, “The Agreement on Safeguards,” in Jacques H. J. 
Bourgeois, Frederique Berrod, and Eric G. Fournier, The Uruguay Round Results, 
Brussels: European Interuniversity Press, 1995, pp.265-273. 
13  The Committee on Safeguards was the committee established in the same Article 
under the authority of the Council for Trade in Goods, which is open to the 
participation of any Member indicating its wish to serve on it. See, Safeguard 
Agreement Article 13.1.  7
  Finally, in Article 8, the Agreement clarifies the effort obligation of importing 
countries to provide an equivalent level of compensation to the affected exporting 
countries14, whereas it reserves the right of exporting countries to suspend the 
application of concessions or other obligations for three years, when the measure has 
been taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports and that such a measure 
conforms to the provisions of the agreement. 
 
(2)  The Intrinsic Nature of Bilateral and Regional Safeguard Mechanisms 
Bilateral and regional safeguard mechanisms have been an integral part of 
most free trade agreements. In fact, the history goes back to the United States 
reciprocal trade agreements in 1940s, which subsequently provided a model for the 
safeguard mechanism under GATT 19. Under those earlier examples of bilateral 
safeguard mechanisms, contracting parties were authorized to restrict imports from 
the other parties, be it through a tariff increase or quantitative restriction, where they 
simply found that their domestic industries were being seriously damaged by such 
imports from the other parties.   
Since the conclusion of the GATT, however, bilateral and regional safeguard 
mechanisms in FTAs have, in theory and to a somewhat lesser extent in practice, 
become a remedy of special and limited nature. Under an international trading system 
based on the nondiscrimination principle, importing countries are primarily allowed to 
resort to the global safeguard measures in order to deal with the negative impacts 
incurred by imports on their domestic industries. Only when such negative impacts by 
imports are the specific results of additional trade liberalization initiatives under FTAs 
can importing countries be allowed to invoke bilateral or regional safeguard measures 
as are regulated under such FTAs. Therefore, in a case where a certain import product 
is an object of additional liberalization initiatives under bilateral or regional 
agreements, as long as the damages incurred by such an import product are not the 
                                                  
14  The former GATT 19 contained no provisions regarding compensation. What was 
deemed to be as such an obligation was, in fact, developed through practices of the 
contracting parties.    8
specific result of such additional liberalization, it is not the purpose of bilateral or 
regional safeguard measures to deal with such damages.   
In short, the global safeguard mechanism, and bilateral or regional safeguard 
mechanisms are two different institutions dealing with problems arising from two 
different free trade initiatives. This is exactly why bilateral and regional safeguard 
mechanisms have their own particular foundations despite the existence of the 
nondiscriminatory global safeguard mechanism. On the contrary, the concept of 
“bilateral or regional antidumping mechanisms” makes no sense because dumping is, 
after all, a single inseparable action of an importing country15. 
Considering such a difference in characteristics between the global safeguard 
mechanism and bilateral or regional safeguard mechanisms, a proliferation of bilateral 
and regional safeguard mechanisms, per se, by no means affect the integrity of the 
global safeguard mechanism, because those two types of mechanisms are not in the 
relationship where the legal principle of lex specialis  derogate generali potentially 
applies16. Nor, on the contrary, does it necessarily contribute to better institutional 
design of a future global safeguard mechanism, because, in principle, there is no such 
relationship between the global safeguard mechanism and bilateral or regional 
                                                  
15  In some FTAs application of the antidumping mechanism is explicitly prohibited or 
additional requirements are attached to it between the contracting parties of such 
agreements (see, for example, Canada Chile FTA Article M-01 and Korea-Singapore 
FTA Article 6.2). However, these, of course, are not the examples of bilateral 
antidumping mechanisms existing together with the global antidumping mechanism. 
Rather they exemplify the case where global regulations are replaced by bilateral 
regulations between the contracting parties which so agreed. 
16  On the contrary, non-application of the global safeguard mechanism, or 
non-application or additional requirements for the application of the antidumping 
mechanism observed in some FTAs (the former include, for example, the 
Australia-Singapore and New Zealand-Singapore FTAs, for the latter, see the footnote 
above) replace the worldwide regulations on such trade instruments between their 
contracting parties and, to that extent, affect the integrity of those regulations. These 
practices not only raise the question of whether they are preferable economically, but 
also the question of whether they are permitted legally. In fact, as some scholars argue 
(see, for example, Akira Kotera, WTO Taisei no Hou Kouzou [On the Structure of the 
WTO System], University of Tokyo Press, 2000) if the WTO constitutes a 
“self-contained regime” in the sense that its law excludes some types of general 
international law, it is possible that the principle of lex specialis derogate generali does 
not apply in its relationship, and such bilateral and regional practices are legally 
unfounded.  9
safeguard mechanisms as to justify judgment on their institutional preferabilities17. 
These, of course, do not mean that, in practice, domestic officials and interested parties 
of an importing country suffer greater complications and thus greater implementation 
costs due to the proliferation of different safeguard mechanisms. In fact, as the number 
of bilateral and regional safeguard mechanisms increases, it will be more and more 
difficult to identify the cause of injury or threat thereof to be responded to by the 
respective mechanisms, and thus the burden on domestic officials and interested 
parties of an importing country multiplies18.  
Given such a nature of bilateral and regional safeguard mechanisms, it is only 
natural that their regulations exhibit some systemic differences from those of the 
global safeguard mechanism. For example, under most bilateral and regional 
safeguard mechanisms concluded in recent years, tariff increases or suspension of 
further tariff reduction are the only applicable measures19, whereas under the global 
safeguard mechanism importing countries are explicitly allowed to invoke other types 
of trade-restrictive measures such as quantitative restrictions20. Where damages on 
                                                  
17  Many scholars argue that FTAs negotiations enable their parties to agree on more 
extensive and more profound international trade rules than in global negotiations, and 
through the pervasion of such rules among different sets of countries, they eventually 
facilitate the achievement of more preferable trade rules at the level of the global 
trading system (see, for example, Hiroshi Mukunoki, “Chiiki boueki kyoutei to 
takaku-teki boueki jiyuu-ka no hokan kanousei [Complementarity of Regional Trade 
Agreeements in Multilateral Trade Liberalization],” RIETI Discussion Paper Series, 
06-J-006, p.19). However, since bilateral and regional safeguard mechanisms are the 
institutions that are inherent to bilateral and regional free trade agreements, no 
matter how a certain type of such mechanisms prevails among different sets of 
countries it does not have any foundation in the global trading system.     
18  These costs associated with the proliferation of bilateral and regional safeguard 
mechanisms are, in essence, of the same nature as what is commonly called “the 
spaghetti bowl problem,” in the context of the proliferation of different sets of rules of 
origin and the subsequent increases in the transaction costs associated with their 
implementations. For the original terminology of the “spaghetti bowl phenomenon,” 
however, see, Akira Kotera, “What is the ‘spaghetti bowl phenomena’?” on the RIETI 
website at http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/columns/a01_0193.html (as of March 31, 2007). 
19  See, for example, Japan-Singapore FTA Article 18.1. 
20  GATT 19 provides that the contracting party shall be free to suspend the obligation 
incurred by a contracting party under the GATT in whole or in part or to withdraw or 
modify the concession (GATT Article 19.1[a]). Although tariff increases and 
quantitative restrictions were the most popular measures applied under the 
mechanism, GATT 19 did not specify what types of measures fell within the scope of 
such suspendable “obligations.” During the negotiations for the GATT 19 amendment  10
domestic industries could be the result of both global and bilateral or regional free 
trade initiatives, suspending the further tariff reduction under FTAs or increasing the 
tariff rate to a level not exceeding the level of the most-favored-nation (MFN) is 
virtually the only possible way to exclusively address the effects of liberalization under 
FTAs. 
 Furthermore, under most bilateral and regional safeguard mechanisms it is 
explicitly articulated that bilateral and regional safeguard measures are, in principle, 
only applicable during the transition period21, while the global safeguard mechanism 
does not provide a specific time limit for the invocation of a safeguard. This difference 
might be due to the requirement of Article 24, para. 8 (b) of the GATT, which states 
that restrictive regulations on commerce shall be eliminated on most all trade22. 
 
2.  Analysis and Evaluation of the Selected Safeguard Mechanisms 
 
(1)  Indicators for Analysis and their Descriptions 
In order to analyze the respective bilateral and regional safeguard 
mechanisms, we came up with nine different indicators as listed in Table 1 of the 
Appendix. In the followings segments we will provide descriptions and explanations on 
what they are and how they are important for the purpose of our analysis. 
                                                                                                                                                  
contracting parties attempted to clarify the scope of the applicable measures. However, 
the Safeguard Agreement concluded as the result of such negotiations essentially 
eluded the issue by simply stating, “This Agreement establishes rules for the 
application of safeguard measures which shall be understood to mean those measures 
provided for in Article 19 of GATT 1994 (Safeguard Agreement Article 1).” 
21  For example, the Japan-Singapore FTA articulates that the bilateral safeguard 
measures provided therein are applicable only during the transition period 
(Japan-Singapore FTA Article 18.1), which, in turn, is defined as the 10 years 
immediately following the agreement's entry into force (Japan-Singapore FTA Article 
11[d]). Interestingly, however, FTAs that were subsequently concluded by Japan 
(Japan-Mexico, Japan-Malaysia, and Japan-Philippines FTAs) do not include the 
concept of a transition period, and thus no predetermined period for the invocation of 
safeguard measures.   
22  See James H. Mathis, “Regional Trade Agreements and Domestic Regulation: What 
Reach for ‘Other Restrictive Regulations of Commerce’?” in Lorand Bartels and 
Federico Ortino eds., Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System, Oxford 
University Press, 2006, pp. 89-91.  11
 
(a)  Conditions for Invocation 
  The first three indicators are the conditions for invocation of the safeguard 
measures, that is, the conditions that must be met for the invocation of safeguard 
measures. In any safeguard mechanism, whether global, bilateral, or regional, the 
requirements for the invocation of safeguard measures are basically threefold23. Firstly, 
injury to domestic industries must be apparent. Secondly, increase in imports of a 
certain product also must be shown. Thirdly, a causal relationship between injury and 
increase in imports must be established. 
  The regulatory details concerning these requirements, however, differ from 
one safeguard mechanism to another. For example, a degree of variety is observed in 
the required level of injury or causation, or how such injury, causation, and increase in 
imports are to be determined. These varieties in the regulation of invocation, of course, 
significantly affect the trade-restrictive nature of the respective safeguard 
mechanisms. For example, if the standard of injury to domestic industries is set so 
high as to put the requirement of injury at an almost insurmountable level, importing 
countries cannot effectively invoke safeguard measures, therefore rendering such a 
mechanism virtually unrestrictive. The impact of the mode of regulations on these 
requirements is considered even more significant when one takes into account the 
recent interpretive practices of the global safeguard mechanism in the WTO dispute 
settlement procedures24. None of the cases brought to the WTO dispute settlement 
                                                  
23  In fact, since the former GATT 19 remained effective as part of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 after the coming into effect of the WTO, the 
“unforeseen developments” requirement therein provided was judged to also remain 
effective as one of the conditions for the invocation of global safeguard measures (see, 
Korea-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Dairy Products: Report of 
the Appellate Body, WT/DS98/AB/R, paragraph 74-77; Argentina-Safeguard Measures 
on Imports of Footwear, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS121/AB/R, paragraph 
79-84). Such a requirement, however, is not articulated in recent bilateral and regional 
safeguard mechanisms, since their provisions are normally drawn from those of the 
Safeguard Agreement and not from those of the former GATT 19. 
24  For the descriptions and evaluations on the interpretive practices of the global 
safeguard mechanism including those on the conditions for invocation, see, generally, 
Ichirou Araki and Tsuyoshi Kawase, WTO taisei-ka no se-fuga-do [The Safeguard 
under the WTO System], Toyo Keizai Inc, 2004; Yong-Shik Lee, Safeguard Measures in  12
mechanism so far have been judged to meet the requirements of these  conditions, 
thus failing to establish the grounds for the invocation of measures in the first place25.     
The regulations of the global safeguard mechanism concerning these 
conditions are provided in the same table for further descriptions of the respective 
indicators and also as a point of reference in order to inquire and evaluate the 
respective bilateral and regional safeguard mechanisms. Under the global safeguard 
mechanism, the level of injury required on domestic industries, for example, is “serious 
injury26” which, in turn, is defined as “significant overall impairment in the position of 
a domestic industry27.” Furthermore, regarding the matter of determining cause of 
injury, it imposes the so-called non-attribution rule, which is articulated as “when 
factors other than increased imports are causing injury to the domestic industry at the 
same time, such injury shall not be attributed to increased imports28.” Each of the 
bilateral and regional safeguard mechanisms will be inquired about according to these 
indicators and in comparison to these regulations of the global safeguard mechanism.       
 
(b) Conditions of Application 
  The next three indicators concern the conditions of application of the 
safeguard measures. These conditions essentially regulate how such measures as are 
allowed under the respective safeguard mechanisms are to be applied, once the 
abovementioned conditions for invocation are deemed to have been satisfied. Such 
conditions include, for example, what period of time measures are allowed to be 
maintained, what period of time and on what conditions measures are allowed to be 
extended, whether or not progressive liberalization is required during the initial 
application, and, given that such a thing is allowed, what period of time is required in 
order to again invoke measures on the same products. Furthermore, some safeguard 
                                                                                                                                                  
World Trade, Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003. 
25  Such cases include Korea-Dairy (DS98), Argentina-Footwear (DS121), US-Wheat 
Gluten (DS166), US-Lamb (DS177/178), US-Line Pipe (DS202), Chile-Price Band 
(DS207), Argentina-Preserved Peaches (DS238), US-Steel 
(DS248/249/251/252/253/254/258/259). 
26 Safeguard  Agreement  Article  2.1. 
27 Ibid,  Article  4.1(a). 
28 Ibid,  Article  4.2(b).  13
mechanisms explicitly refer to the concept of adjustment in relation to, for example, 
the determination of the period of initial application, the allowability of the extension 
of the initial measures, and the purpose of the progressive liberalization of the initial 
measures. These referrals to the concept of adjustment are also considered important, 
because in some cases they are actually expected to significantly constrain the 
application of measures, as has been indicated in the interpretive practice of the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism29. 
  The impact of these conditions of application on the assessment of the 
trade-restrictive nature of the safeguard mechanisms is also straightforward. For 
example, the longer the maximum period of application and the looser the conditions 
for such determinations, the longer the measures can be maintained, and thus such a 
mechanism is generally considered more trade-restrictive. In fact, as we have stated 
earlier in this paper, in GATT 19 it was only articulated that countries could resort to 
safeguard measures “to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or 
remedy such injury 30.” The ambiguous wording of the former global safeguard 
regulations virtually left unregulated the question of an applicable time period, 
thereby allowing the measures to be maintained indefinitely. This raised a cry for 
greater specificity regarding the application of safeguard measures, thus leading to the 
formulation of the highly detailed regulations of the Safeguard Agreement. For 
example, in the new agreement on global safeguard measures, the maximum period of 
initial application and the total maximum period after extension are specified to be 
four and eight years respectively31. In the case that the expected duration of such 
measures is more than one year, countries are required to liberalize the measure 
progressively at regular intervals32. 
  The conditions of application of bilateral and regional safeguard mechanisms 
are generally more rigid than those of the global safeguard mechanism. However, 
                                                  
29  See, for example, Korea-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Dairy 
Products: Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS98/AB/R, paragraph 96. 
30 GATT  Article  19.1(a). 
31 Safeguard  Agreement  Article 7.1 and 7.3 respectively. 
32 Ibid,  Article  7.4.  14
certain variations exist in the regulations of conditions among different bilateral and 
regional safeguard mechanisms, and therefore detailed inquiries and comparative 
analysis according to such conditions are considered meaningful.       
 
(c) Procedural Conditions 
  Finally, the last three indicators are the procedural conditions that the parties 
must or are allowed to follow domestically or internationally in order for the 
implementation of the safeguard mechanism.   
The first indicator, the “domestic investigation,” is a set of regulations that 
importing countries are obliged to follow when they investigate whether the invocation 
of safeguard measures is justified. Recent safeguard mechanisms have generally 
provided rigid and detailed regulations regarding the conditions for their invocations. 
However, if the determination of the conditions were to be made arbitrarily by the 
domestic authority of an importing country, the value of such regulations and thus the 
rights of the affected exporting countries would be severely undermined. This remains 
true even where a neutral dispute settlement is available internationally and therefore 
such determinations by the domestic authority are to be overturned afterwards. 
Procedures usually require a considerable amount of time, as well as being 
economically very costly. In the global safeguard mechanism of the WTO, detailed 
regulations are provided regarding the obligations of public notice, public hearing, and 
publication of a report33, with the purpose of ensuring that views of all the interested 
parties are sufficiently reflected. 
  The second of this group of indicators is the notification and consultation 
requirements imposed on the importing countries. In order for the implementation of 
the safeguard mechanism to be legally sound, there needs to be a procedural guarantee 
which provides sufficient information and time so that the affected exporting countries 
can fully express their own views. For this purpose, the global safeguard mechanism 
specifies when and with whom such notifications and consultations are required, as 
                                                  
33 Ibid,  Article  3.1.  15
well as their contents and procedures34. Bilateral and regional safeguard mechanisms 
also impose such obligations at varying degrees, thus justifying their in-depth 
assessment of how the fair and effective implementation of these potentially 
destructive mechanisms is to be secured among different mechanisms. 
  The last indicator is the applicability of a “neutral dispute settlement,” 
indicating a type of international procedure subject to an impartial third party 
judgment comparable to an international adjudication. The importance of this 
indicator for the purpose of our analysis is indisputable. Without a neutral dispute 
settlement procedure applied on a compulsory basis, all regulations regarding the 
implementation of the safeguard mechanism are basically entrusted to 
auto-interpretation by the respective parties. This virtually allows the importing 
countries under the GATT to exercise a high level of discretion concerning when and 
how the measures are to be applied. The WTO, on the other hand, enjoys a highly 
judicialized dispute settlement system35, wherein all interpretative issues concerning 
the implementation of the safeguard mechanism are subjected to and determined in a 
neutral manner. Here, we examine what types of dispute settlement procedures are 
applicable in the respective safeguard mechanisms in order to assess how effectively 
the implementation of the mechanism is secured among different agreements. 
 
(d) Other Possible Indicators 
  In addition to the nine indicators detailed above, safeguard mechanisms 
include other regulations that could potentially influence their trade-restrictive nature, 
the most important of which being, arguably, the effort obligation of compensation on 
the part of importing countries and the right of rebalancing on the part of the affected 
exporting countries. However, these provisions remain essentially the same among 
                                                  
34 Ibid,  Article  12. 
35  In this context, developments such as the introduction of the negative consensus 
rule at the establishment of the procedures and at the adoption of their reports, the 
establishment of the Appellate Body, and the provision of a specific time schedule for 
the procedures merit special attention. For the details and nature of the dispute 
settlement procedures of the WTO, see, especially, Kotera, supra note 16, ch.2, 4, and 
5.  16
different bilateral and regional safeguard mechanisms. For example, the mechanisms 
generally authorize the immediate execution of rebalancing measures by the affected 
exporting countries without the provision of a moratorium period stipulated under the 
Safeguard Agreement36. Therefore these regulations are excluded from the scope of our 
analysis despite their general importance in the overall scheme of these mechanisms. 
 
(2)  The Analysis of the Selected Bilateral and Regional Safeguard Mechanisms 
  The actual regulations of the respective bilateral and regional safeguard 
mechanisms on the above-mentioned nine indicators are summarized in Tables 2 and 3 
of the Appendix. Here we analyze the respective bilateral and regional safeguard 
mechanisms and speculate on the backgrounds of their respective characteristics. 
 
(a) NAFTA 
The regional safeguard mechanism in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA)37  shares a great similarity with the global safeguard mechanism 
of the WTO. Although this mechanism was adopted one year earlier than that of the 
WTO, the similarity comes as no surprise considering that both safeguard mechanisms 
refer extensively to the same domestic safeguard provisions of the United States, the 
dominant country of NAFTA38. Looking closely at the provisions, it seems that the 
regional safeguard mechanism in NAFTA provides more detailed and rigid regulations 
on its conditions for invocation than its elaborate counterparts in the global safeguard 
mechanism. For example, in NAFTA the increase in imports needs to be “in absolute 
terms39,” whereas the global safeguard mechanism makes no such distinction between 
                                                  
36  See, for example, Japan-Singapore FTA Article 18.4. 
37  NAFTA Article 801-805. The safeguard mechanism provided in this agreement, 
however, only applies to the bilateral relationships between Mexico on the one hand 
and the United States and Canada on the other. Bilateral safeguard measures between 
the United States and Canada are subjected to the provisions of Article 1101 of the 
Canada-US FTA, which is incorporated into and made a part of NAFTA for such 
purpose. See, NAFTA Annex 801. 
38  The Trade Act of 1974§201-204. 
39 NAFTA  Article  801.1.  17
absolute and relative increases40. Furthermore, concerning the standard of causation 
requirement, the former requires that imports alone constitute a substantial cause of 
serious injury41, whereas the global safeguard mechanism remains silent on such a 
standard.  
The most prominent feature of this regional safeguard mechanism, however, is 
that it explicitly articulates that no party may request the establishment of an arbitral 
panel regarding any proposed safeguard measures42. At first glance, such a provision 
seems incongruous for a safeguard mechanism with such detailed and rigid conditions. 
However, once one becomes aware of the extensive and thorough nature of its 
regulations on domestic investigation43, the inapplicability of the international neutral 
dispute settlement procedure can arguably be seen as not so much a lack of procedural 
guarantee44. That is, the effective implementation of the safeguard mechanism is 
designed to be secured not so much through the interactions of the member countries 
representing their interested parties, but rather by guaranteeing sufficient due process 
rights at the level of domestic investigation to the affected interested parties 
regardless of their nationalities. 
    
(b)  EFTA 
The Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 
which was concluded in 1960 and later amended in 2001, possesses truly unique 
                                                  
40  However, as previously stated in this paper, the Safeguard Agreement, interestingly, 
distinguishes absolute and relative increases in imports in the context of the 
rebalancing measures. See, Safeguard Agreement Article 8.3. 
41 NAFTA  Article  801.1. 
42 Ibid,  Article  804. 
43  Not only are the regulations concerning the notice requirement and the public 
hearing better elaborated than in the Safeguard Agreement, it particularly puts forth 
detailed provisions on issues such as the institution of a proceeding and the contents of 
a petition or complaint. Ibid, Article 803 and Annex 803. 
44  However, it needs to be remembered that such regulations on the domestic 
investigations concern only the determination of conditions for invocation. The 
determination of conditions of application, on the contrary, are not subjected to such 
domestic proceedings, and thus without the application of a neutral international 
dispute settlement procedure, the affected exporting countries and their interested 
parties are basically devoid of the opportunities to secure their implementation.  18
regional safeguard mechanisms45.  
Article 40.1 of the Convention which provides the grounds and the basic 
framework for the measures reads “If serious economic, societal or environmental 
difficulties of a sectorial or regional nature liable to persist are arising, a Member 
State may unilaterally take appropriate measures under the conditions and 
procedures set out in Article 41.” Immediately obvious from the text is that member 
countries are allowed to invoke trade restrictive measures otherwise prohibited under 
the convention, as long as certain types of difficulties of a “sectorial” or “regional” 
nature are deemed existent. Since the mechanism does not further elaborate on the 
nature or the extent of the difficulties except that they are “economic,” “societal” or 
“environmental” of a “serious” degree, it can safely be said that member countries 
enjoy enormous discretion on the invocation of such measures. The original safeguard 
mechanism included in the 1960 convention46  shared the same particularly wide range 
of grounds for the invocation of measures 47, but their actual application was 
considerably controlled due to the prior multilateral authorization procedure48, as well 
as the provision of a specific time frame for the measures49.  
This unusual regression, as it were, in the rigidities of the regulations 
observed between the 1960 and 2001 conventions can best be understood as the 
consequence of change in member constitution, thus also the overall purpose of the 
organization. At its conclusion in 1960, the organization included seven member 
countries and was the largest regional free trade agreement50, with the view to further 
liberalize trade among its member countries beyond the level of the worldwide trading 
system. Therefore, the member countries readily possessed enough incentive to control 
the use of trade-restrictive measures in order to secure the objectives and benefits of 
the newly established organization. Contrarily, due to the consecutive withdrawals of 
                                                  
45  EFTA Convention (Consolidated Version: 2001) Article 40 and 41. 
46  EFTA Convention (Stockholm 1960) Article 20. 
47 Ibid,  Article  20.1(a). 
48 Ibid,  Article  20.1. 
49 Ibid,  Article  20.2. 
50  The initial member countries of the EFTA included Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  19
its member countries, as well as the foundation of the European Economic Area 
between the European Community (EC) and three of the remaining four member 
countries of the EFTA 51, the 2001 EFTA Convention, including the safeguard 
mechanism therein provided, effectively applies only to the relations between 
Switzerland and the other EFTA member countries. Consequently, the other three 
member countries did not readily have the incentives to negate the argument for more 
flexible safeguard mechanisms, thus leading to the unique and unusually lax 
conditions for the invocation and the application of the safeguard measures.   
  
(c)  AFTA 
The safeguard mechanism included in the Agreement on the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)52 is best 
characterized by its great resemblance to the former global safeguard mechanism,  
GATT 19. In particular, it elaborates no further on the standard or the method of 
determination of the respective conditions for invocation, and also remains completely 
silent on issues such as timeframe, extension, and reapplication of the safeguard 
measures. The lax and nonspecific regulatory nature displayed by the safeguard 
mechanism, in fact, greatly conforms to the overall scheme for trade liberalization of 
this agreement.   
As a general framework for trade liberalization among heterogeneous 
developing countries in the Southeast Asian region, this agreement is best understood 
as a collection of general principles, rather than rules of a detailed and specific 
nature53. Correspondingly, the primary dispute settlement procedure available under 
                                                  
51  The contracting parties to the 2001 Convention include Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Norway and Switzerland. Among those four countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway are the members of the EEA. 
52  AFTA Article 6. In a strict sense AFTA is not the agreement for establishing the free 
trade area under GATT 24, but is based upon the Enabling Clause of GATT of 1979. 
53  Such a general and flexible nature of the agreement is clearly in line with the 
political motive for its establishment. In fact, it was widely recognized that the 
establishment of a free trade agreement was not so feasible from an economic 
perspective due especially to the enormous variety in political regimes and economic 
conditions as well as the similar export product lines among the countries in this 
region (see, for example, Kouichi Satou, “AFTA wo meguru ASEAN no ikinai seiji  20
the agreement, including the disputes arising from the safeguard mechanism, is 
consultation between the parties involved in the dispute, with the minor alternative of 
submitting the issues to a council comprised of nominees from each member country 
which is, therefore, a procedure of a political nature54. 
   
(d) EC-Mexico 
The bilateral safeguard mechanism included in the EC-Mexico FTA 55 
demonstrates a remarkable yet somewhat plausible imbalance between the 
regulations on the conditions for invocation and those on the conditions of application. 
Specifically, while it provides rigid and detailed provisions on how the measures are to 
be applied56, it remains considerably unspecific on what occasions such measures are 
initially applicable57. This unique structure of the mechanism can readily be explained 
by the EC’s long-standing philosophy toward its safeguard policy.   
As it was especially evident throughout the negotiating history of the GATT 
19 amendment58, EC has been the champion of more flexible safeguard mechanisms 
for the purpose of addressing its strong political needs. Thus, its preferred strategy has 
been geared toward relaxing the requirements for the invocation of measures, while 
attempting to minimize its negative impacts on trade through rigid and detailed 
regulations on how such measures are to be applied. In fact, this bilateral safeguard 
mechanism between the EC and Mexico goes beyond relaxing the rigid and elaborate 
conditions for invocation of the global safeguard mechanism by providing other 
grounds for the invocation of measurers apart from the usual “injury to domestic 
industries” requirements. Specifically, grounds include “serious disturbances in any 
sector of economy,” and “difficulties which could bring about serious deterioration in 
                                                                                                                                                  
[Internal Politics of the ASEAN Countries on AFTA],” in Toshio Watanabe ed., Higashi 
ajia keizai tougou heno michi [The Road to the Integration of East Asian Economy], 
Keisou Shobou, 2004). 
54  Ibid, Article 6.3. See also, Article 7 and 8 for the provisions on institutional 
arrangements and consultations.   
55 EC-Mexico  FTA  Article  15. 
56  Ibid, Article 15.2 and 15.3. 
57 Ibid,  Article  15.1. 
58  See, for example, Stewart, supra note 10.  21
the economic situation of a region of the importing Party59.” 
   
(e)  Australia-New Zealand 
The bilateral safeguard mechanism in the Australia New Zealand Closer 
Economic Relations Trade Agreement 60 takes on a characteristic middle-ground 
between GATT 19 and the Safeguard Agreement, which is only natural given that the 
agreement was concluded in 1983, right after the initial negotiations of the GATT 19 
amendment conducted during the Tokyo Round.   
Throughout its provisions, this bilateral safeguard mechanism abunds with 
the efforts of the parties to effectively address the potential negative impacts of the 
highly flexible GATT 19-esque regulations, though such attempts manifest themselves 
in ways and degrees dissimilar to those of the Safeguard Agreement. The attempts 
include, for example, further elaborations on the standard of injury and the threat 
thereof61, provisions of somewhat detailed conditions of application including a specific 
timeframe for the initial application of measures62, and most notably, an introduction 
of regulations concerning domestic investigations; namely a provision outlining the 
opportunity for evidence to be presented by the other party63.  
However, no neutral dispute settlement procedure is provided in the 
agreement, and this, combined with the political nature of the consultation 
requirement in this mechanism, namely, the requirement of consultation prior to 
domestic investigation with the aim of reaching a solution64, clearly underlines its 
dissimilarity to the more judicialized mechanisms of the Safeguard Agreement and 
their like. 
   
(f)  US-Singapore 
The bilateral safeguard mechanism provided in the United States-Singapore 
                                                  
59 EC-Mexico  FTA  Article  15.1(b). 
60  Australia-New Zealand FTA Article 17. 
61 Ibid,  Article  17.2(a). 
62  Ibid, Article 17.6, 17.7(a) and 17.9(a). 
63 Ibid,  Article  17.4(a). 
64 Ibid,  Article  17.3.  22
Free Trade Agreement65 draws extensively from the provisions of the Safeguard 
Agreement, except that the timeframe for the measures is more rigid66 and the 
reapplication of the measures is not allowed67, due to the aforementioned transitional 
character of bilateral and regional safeguard mechanisms.   
One particularly interesting departure from the Safeguard Agreement and 
the mechanism in the United States’ former regional trade agreement, NAFTA, is that 
it somewhat relaxes the requirement of causation by directly introducing the standard 
adopted in the United States’ domestic safeguard provisions68. This undoubtedly 
deliberative modification of the key requirement for the invocation of measures is 
supposedly explained by the apparently strict interpretive practices of the WTO on this 
requirement69, and the US's disappointment toward them70. Throughout the cases 
submitted before it, the dispute settlement body of WTO has systemically introduced 
an extraordinary textual approach to the interpretation of this somewhat ambiguous 
requirement, finding, consequently, all cases inconsistent with the provision of the 
Safeguard Agreement71.  
 
(g)  US-Australia 
The bilateral safeguard mechanism in the United States-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement72, which was concluded a year after that of the United States-Singapore 
                                                  
65  US-Singapore FTA Article 7. 
66 Ibid,  Article  7.2.6. 
67 Ibid,  Article  7.2.7. 
68  Ibid, Article 7.1 and 7.6.4. 
69  For descriptions and evaluations on such interpretive practices, see, for example, 
Yoshinori Abe, “Se-fuga-do kyoutei ni okeru inga kannkei youken [Attribution of the 
Safeguard],” Ichirou Araki and Tsuyoshi Kawase, ed., op. cit, 2004; Yong-Shik Lee, 
Safeguard Measures in World Trade, Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003, 
pp.132-134. 
70  For the general perception of the United States toward the interpretive practices on 
the causation requirement, see, for example, General Accountability Office, World 
Trade Organization: Standard of Review and Impact of Trade Remedy Rulings, 2003, 
p.22. 
71  Such cases include Argentina-Footwear (DS121), US-Wheat Gluten (DS166), 
US-Lamb (DS177/178), US-Line Pipe (DS202), Chile-Price Band (DS207), US-Steel 
(DS248/249/251/252/253/254/258/259). 
72  US-Australia FTA Article 9.  23
FTA, shares the same provisions with its predecessor, which, in turn, drew extensively 
from the provisions of the Safeguard Agreement. 
 
(h) Japan-Mexico 
The bilateral safeguard mechanism in the Agreement between Japan and 
Mexico for the Strengthening of the Economic Partnership 73 exhibits rigid and 
detailed regulations on the conditions of the safeguard measures, yet to a somewhat 
lesser extent than those of the Japan-Singapore FTA. For instance, it only provides 
that the standard of causation be “substantial cause74,” while the period of initial 
application is considerably longer75, and the measures can be applied more than twice 
on the same products76. This difference between the two agreements concluded by 
Japan is likely explained by the remarkable difference in the industrial structures of 
the two trading partners. Specifically, a substantial proportion of imports from Mexico 
consist of agricultural products77, and this readily brought about huge concerns and 
fears among vulnerable yet politically strong Japanese competitors, thus leading to the 
advocacy of more flexible mechanisms in order to enable their remedies78. Furthermore 
this safeguard mechanism can be invoked with no time limit (even after the transition 
period elapses). This is one of the most remarkable differences from other safeguard 
                                                  
73  Japan-Mexico FTA Article 51-56. 
74 Ibid,  Article  53.1. 
75 Ibid,  Article  53.5. 
76 Ibid,  Article  53.6. 
77  Agricultural products, including fishery, accounted for 21.6% of the total imports 
from Mexico as of 2001 (Kimihiko Inaba, “Nichi-boku FTA no igi [The Significance of 
the Japan-Mexico FTA]” in Shujiro Urata ed., FTA gaidobukku [Guidebook of FTAs], 
JETRO, 2002), whereas agricultural products from Singapore accounted for only 1.9% 
of the total imports as of 1999 (Jun Shigeoka, “Nihon･Singapo-ru shinjidai keizai 
renkei kyoutei no igi [The Significance of the Japan-Singapore FTA],” in ibid).   
78  It is not that there were no such concerns and fears concerning liberalization in 
agricultural products upon the negotiation of the Japan-Singapore FTA. Rather, since 
the agricultural imports accounted for only a marginal part of the overall imports from 
Singapore, sensitive agricultural products were able to be largely excluded from the 
scope of the bilateral liberalization. In the case of the Japan-Mexico FTA, on the 
contrary, agricultural products amounted to a substantial part of the total imports. 
Therefore they could not simply exclude all of the sensitive agricultural products since 
an FTA must meet the requirement to liberalize “substantially all trade,” the key 
requirement of the WTO concerning the conformity of free trade agreements (GATT 
Article 24.8[b]).  24
mechanisms of the FTAs analyzed in this paper79. Additionally, this bilateral safeguard 
mechanism provides extraordinarily elaborate and comprehensive regulations on 
domestic investigations, so much that it has no equal among other bilateral and 
regional safeguard mechanisms80. 
 
(i)  Japan-Singapore 
The bilateral safeguard mechanism provided in the Japan-Singapore 
Economic Agreement for a New Age Partnership81 exhibits one of the most extreme 
examples of rigidified and detailed mechanisms for safeguard measures. Specifically, 
the mechanism requires that the increase in imports be “in absolute terms82,” and that 
such imports “alone constitute a substantial cause83.” Furthermore, even when such 
particularly rigid requirements are deemed to be satisfied, the measures are initially 
applicable only for one year84. It is broadly understood that the Japanese government 
was especially motivated to achieve a high-level free trade agreement, in order to 
demonstrate that the abolition of its long-standing philosophy against bilateral and 
regional FTAs85 was not a shift toward an exclusive regionalism in conflict with the 
idea of the nondiscriminatory world trading system. Rather, its intent was to show that 
this FTA was merely another product of its attempts to achieve the same goal of trade 
liberalization and that it complements rather than undermines the multilateral 
liberalization initiatives of the world trading system. This, combined with its 
                                                  
79  See note 21. 
80  In addition to the detailed regulations on the public notice and the public hearing, it 
especially elaborates on the guarantee of access to information for the interested 
parties of the respective contracting parties. Japan-Mexico FTA Article 55. 
81  Japan-Singapore FTA Article 18. 
82 Ibid,  Article  18.1. 
83 Ibid,  Article  18.1. 
84 Ibid,  Article  18.3(d). 
85  For example, the following statement in White Paper on International Trade 1999 
clearly manifests such an opposition toward bilateral and regional free trade 
agreements: “As one of the few developed countries which do not participate in 
institutionalized regional integrations, Japan has to monitor and secure that such 
regional integrations will not resort to trade restrictive measures (Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry), Tsuusho hakusho [White Paper on International 
Trade], Ookura shou insatsukyoku, 1999, ch.5,§3.3(2)”   25
traditional stance against arbitrary applications of trade remedy measures, 
contributed greatly to the extraordinarily rigid and detailed nature of its safeguard 
provisions. 
   
(j)  Korea-Chile 
The free trade agreement between Korea and Chile remarkably does not put 
forth any provisions on general bilateral safeguard measures. This means neither 
country is allowed to take trade-restrictive measures in order to address negative 
impacts to its domestic industries specifically arising out of this bilateral agreement. 
However, the global safeguard measures remain applicable between the two 
countries86, and therefore each country is able to restrict the imports from the other 
country, as long as such restrictions are applied on a nondiscriminatory basis among 
different countries.   
Finally, but most importantly, agricultural goods are deemed an exception due 
to the alleged “particular sensitivity of the agricultural markets87,” thus the agreement 
authorizes special emergency measures for such goods, for which regulations are 
characterized by its GATT 19-esque flexibility 88 . To accurately evaluate the 




The bilateral safeguard mechanism in the Korea-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement89 widely echoes the provisions of the agreement that Singapore concluded 
with the United States in the previous year. Its provisions are largely characterized by 
the rigidity and detailed nature observed in the Safeguard Agreement. 
 
                                                  
86  Korea-Chile FTA Article 6.1 explicitly articulates “both parties maintain their rights 
and obligations under Article 19 of GATT and the Agreement on Safeguards, which is 
part of the WTO.” 
87 Ibid,  Article  3.12.1 
88 Ibid,  Article  3.12 
89  Korea-Singapore FTA Article 6.4.  26
(l)  China-ASEAN 
The safeguard mechanism included in the Agreement on Trade in Goods of the 
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between the ASEAN 
and China90 systemically introduces the provisions of the Safeguard Agreement with 
some minor exceptions arising mostly out of the structural differences between the 
global and regional mechanisms. In fact, the China-ASEAN FTA simply articulates 
that “the Parties shall adopt the rules for the application of safeguard measures as 
provided under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, with the exception of the 
quantitative restriction measures set out in Article 5, and Article 9, 13 and 14 of the 
WTO Agreement on Safeguards91.”  
As a consequence of such comprehensive referral to the global safeguard 
provisions, this safeguard mechanism possesses one prominent feature that other 
bilateral and regional safeguard mechanisms lack – it reserves the right of the affected 
exporting countries to suspend the application of substantially equivalent concessions 
and other obligations for three years, a provision which marks a structural change 
undergone by the global safeguard mechanism from the more politically oriented 
GATT 19 to the legally oriented Safeguard Agreement92. 
 
(3)  Classification of the Selected Bilateral and Regional Safeguard Mechanisms 
  So far, we have looked into the details of the respective bilateral and regional 
safeguard mechanisms and highlighted the prominent features and backgrounds of 
each. Here, we provide a classification of the investigated safeguard mechanisms and 
                                                  
90  China-ASEAN FTA Article 9. 
91  China-ASEAN FTA Article 18.6 
92  Concerning the right of rebalancing conferred on the affected exporting countries, 
there had always been a question on why the importing countries need to suffer such a 
burden in taking bona fide temporary action (see, for example, Jan Tumlir, “A Revised 
Safeguard Clause for GATT?” Journal of World Trade Law , 7-4[1973], pp.404-420). 
The best answer for this was that safeguard measures were, after all, of political 
nature, and the political benefits arising from the invocations of measures on the part 
of the importing countries were intended to be balanced with those of the affected 
exporting countries. It was very indicative in this context that the Safeguard 
Agreement of the WTO reserves this right of rebalancing on condition that the 
safeguard measures taken by the importing countries conform to the provisions of the 
Agreement.     27
attempt to evaluate which bilateral and regional mechanisms are comparably more 
trade-restrictive or less trade-restrictive (the classification of types of bilateral and 
regional safeguard mechanisms are summarized in Table 4 of the Appendix). 
 
(a)  No General Safeguard Type 
Bilateral and regional free trade agreements in this category simply provide no 
general mechanisms that enable their parties to take trade-restrictive measures for 
the purpose of addressing the negative impacts on their domestic industries incurred 
by such bilateral or regional trade liberalization. Therefore, this type is clearly the 
least trade-restrictive (or more precisely, non trade-restrictive) of all the types of 
general safeguard mechanisms. Among the bilateral and regional free trade 
agreements investigated, the Korea-Chile FTA is the only example that fits into this 
category. 
However, the achievement of this agreement can never be overestimated 
because, most importantly, it provides a special type of emergency measure addressing 
only the injury to domestic industries incurred by agricultural imports. Given the 
highly flexible nature of this special safeguard mechanism, the overall safeguard 
scheme of this agreement could, in fact, be evaluated as one of the most 
trade-restrictive. 
 
(b) Quasi-Global Safeguard Type 
ⅰ. WTO Type 
          The second category of bilateral and regional safeguard mechanism is the type 
with similar characteristics to the Safeguard Agreement of the WTO. These 
mechanisms typically possess rigid and detailed conditions for invocation and 
conditions of application, and are also characterized by detailed domestic and 
international proceedings including neutral dispute settlement procedures. Due to its 
exhaustive regulations on when and how the measures are to be applied, as well as 
sufficient procedural guarantees to secure fair and effective implementation of the 
regulations, the trade-restrictive nature of this type of safeguard mechanism is  28
considered significantly limited. The apparently exacting interpretive practices of the 
WTO in recent years further fortify such a conviction.   
Among the bilateral and regional safeguard mechanisms investigated, the 
ones under the US-Australia, US-Singapore, Japan-Mexico, Japan-Singapore, 
Korea-Singapore, and China-ASEAN FTAs are classified into this category. The virtual 
impossibility of weighing the importance of the respective indicators utilized in this 
analysis (an evaluation of the relative importance between a rigid standard of injury 
and a rigid timeframe for the initial application, for example,) makes further 
evaluation or ranking, as it were, among the six listed mechanisms basically 
unfeasible. However, due especially to its regulatory thoroughness on the conditions 
for invocation and the conditions of application, the one in the Japan-Singapore FTA is, 
arguably, the least trade-restrictive, while other mechanisms adopting the same 
“substantial cause” requirement as the United States domestic safeguard mechanism93 
seem to have considerably alleviated the burden of proof on their conditions for 
invocation, and are thus considered somewhat more trade-restrictive than the others. 
ⅱ. GATT Type 
          On the other hand, the safeguard mechanisms under AFTA and the 
Australia-New Zealand FTA are, to a different degree, characterized by their 
resemblance to the more flexible mechanisms of GATT 19, thus deserving yet another 
category of bilateral and regional safeguard mechanism. Typically, this type of 
safeguard mechanism leaves the conditions for invocation and the conditions of 
application largely unspecific, while their domestic and international proceedings 
remain generally of a political nature. Therefore, their implementations are largely 
dependent on the political conditions present at a given time among each set of affected 
parties, and thus, theoretically, it remains uncertain how trade-restrictive such 
mechanisms are to be. However, the practices under GATT 19 and the subsequent need 
for its amendment clearly signify that politically oriented safeguard mechanisms most 
                                                  
93  These are namely the ones in the US-Singapore, US-Australia, and 
Korea-Singapore FTAs. The Japan-Mexico FTA also provides the same “substantial 
cause” standard, but remains silent on its definition.  29
likely lead to abuse, and therefore end up restricting trade much more significantly 
than those of a legal orientation. Between the two bilateral and regional safeguard 
mechanisms classified in this category, the one in the Australia-New Zealand FTA is 
much more responsive to the negative aspects of such politically oriented safeguard 
mechanisms, and its regulations better represent efforts to bring discipline and 
objectivity to the use of its safeguard measures.     
ⅲ. NAFTA Type 
      The safeguard mechanism provided in NAFTA shares the same feature with 
the GATT Type mechanisms in that the disputes arising from the mechanism cannot 
be subjected to the neutral dispute settlement procedures provided in the agreement. 
However, classifying this safeguard mechanism under the same category as that type 
of mechanism would be extremely misleading. Due to the highly rigid and detailed 
conditions as well as the exceptionally elaborate regulations to secure sufficient due 
process to the affected parties at the level of the domestic investigations, this 
safeguard mechanism seems by no means as vulnerable to political abuses as the 
aforementioned GATT Type mechanisms. Rather, as previously stated, the 
unavailability of international neutral dispute settlement procedures in this 
mechanism is better understood as the product of its state-to-businesses orientation 
rather than the state-to-state alternative in order to achieve the same purpose to 
secure fair and effective implementation of the safeguard mechanism. Thus, this 
safeguard mechanism is potentially much less trade-restrictive than the GATT Type 
mechanisms, not to mention those of the WTO Type. 
 
(c) European Type 
      The last category of bilateral and regional safeguard mechanism is the type 
observed in EFTA and the EU-Mexico FTA. The bottom line of this type of mechanism 
is the different grounds that it provides for the invocation of measures other than the 
normal “injury to domestic industries” requirements. In fact, technically, this type of 
mechanism raises the question of conceptual delimitation of safeguard mechanisms, 
because if one understands the essence of the institution as the remedy to injured  30
import-competing industries, measures regulated under these “safeguard 
mechanisms,” at least partially, go well beyond the scope of such conceptualization.   
Aside from the reservation, the exact assessment of the trade-restrictive 
nature of these mechanisms in comparison with others, particularly with the GATT 
Type mechanisms, is impracticable because it essentially comes down to the weighing 
of negative effects arising from the risk of arbitral implementations of the measures on 
the one hand, and the effects of legitimate yet exceptionally permissive regulations on 
the invocation of measures on the other. However, it is worthwhile to acknowledge and 
stress that under these European Type mechanisms no matter how much the modes of 
application are elaborated in the regulations and ensured by detailed and neutral 
proceedings, contracting parties and member countries enjoy an enormous amount of 
discretion on the key factor of when such measures are initially applicable, without the 
otherwise harsh confrontations, both political and legal, with the affected exporting 
countries and their interested parties.   
Finally, between the two mechanisms classified in this category, the one under 
the EC-Mexico FTA is clearly less trade-restrictive in that it is subject to more rigidity 
and specificity throughout its regulations. 
 
3.  Conclusion 
 
  We have investigated 12 different bilateral and regional safeguard 
mechanisms and attempted to evaluate which types of safeguard mechanism and 
which mechanisms among them are, on an ordinary basis, more trade-restrictive or 
less trade-restrictive than others.   
However, although it provides essential insights for understanding of the 
respective safeguard mechanisms, as well as the FTAs in which these mechanisms are 
included, of utmost importance for the purpose of our analysis is the knowledge that 
this evaluation constitutes only half of the overall understanding of the significance of 
safeguard mechanisms. Specifically, the evaluation only addresses the negative 
impacts on trade of the safeguard mechanisms, while systemically dismissing the  31
possibility of their positive functions. In fact, examinations focused solely on the 
negative impacts of safeguard mechanisms contend, as some scholars argue94, that the 
mechanisms merely reflect the interests of politically powerful import-competing 
industries and produce no significant outcomes favorable to overall free trade 
initiatives. Conversely, if one holds the position that the mechanisms, in fact, serve 
some positive functions other than just restricting trade, the evaluation of the 
preferability of the respective mechanisms is fully attained only after examining the 
trade-offs between the negative and the positive impacts that the mechanisms bring 
about. 
In domestic trade politics, it is generally the import-competing industries that 
enjoy the most influence on policy outcomes because they have the biggest stake in the 
subject and are thus politically the most mobilized. Safeguard mechanisms are 
considered to serve as a safety valve for this influence by the import-competing 
industries95. That is, by providing a mechanism which enables the policymakers to 
restrict trade at crucial moments, the protectionist pressures from these industries are 
alleviated, and, as a consequence, further trade liberalization is encouraged. If parties 
of a FTA are in need of a special safety valve to conciliate otherwise obstinate 
protectionist positions of their import-competing industries, it makes perfect sense 
that each bilateral and regional free trade agreement includes its own safeguard 
mechanism in order to achieve further liberalization under such an agreement96. To 
                                                  
94  See, for example, Melvyn B. Krauss, The New Protectionism: the welfare state and 
international trade, New York: New York University Press, 1978, pp.66-67. 
95  See, Alan O. Sykes, “Protectionism as a ‘Safeguard’: A Positive Analysis of the GATT 
‘Escape Mechanism’ with Normative Speculations,” University of Chicago Law Review, 
58-1(1991), pp.255-303; Hyokusu Yu, GATT dai 19 zyou to kokusai tsuusyou hou no 
kinou [Article 19 of GATT and Functions of International Trade Law], Tokyo daigaku 
shuppan kai, 1994. 
96  Besides the trade liberalization viewpoint, we can think of other positive economic 
functions of the safeguard mechanisms, such as the alleviation of adjustment costs by 
controlling the flow of imports (see, for example, Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis, 
“United States- Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb 
Meat from New Zealand and Australia: what should be required of a safeguard 
investigation?” World Trade Review, 2-3[2003], pp.395-430) and the achievement of 
distributive justice by preventing the expansion of income disparities arising from 
trade liberalization (see, Alan Deardoff, “Safeguards Policy and the Conservative 
Social Welfare Function,” in Henryk Kierzkowski ed., Protection and Competition in  32
this effect, the fact that the safeguard mechanisms in FTAs often most allow an 
immediate execution of the rebalancing measures fortifies the opinion that bilateral 
and regional safeguard mechanisms are especially geared toward such a political 
function. Provision of compensation and acceptance of retaliatory trade measures 
practically constrain the actual use of safeguard measures, while the protectionist 
opposition of the import-competing industries is effectively mitigated by the almost 
false conviction that remedies are always available when the situation turns 
exceptionally difficult. 
  The importance of the political function of bilateral and regional safeguard 
mechanisms means that in order to evaluate the preferability of the respective 
safeguard mechanisms, we have to pay special attention to the level of political 
function they serve. Specifically, what is required for such an evaluation is to assess 
and compare the potential costs arising from the mechanisms' trade-restrictive nature 
on the one hand, and the benefits produced by the achievement of further trade 
liberalization through the existence on the other. Any final remarks on the 
comparative evaluation or the ranking of the mechanisms come, in that sense, only 
after such a cost and benefit analysis of the individual mechanisms is conducted. Thus, 
even when a certain safeguard mechanism is considered to be one of the least 
trade-restrictive mechanisms of all, if it contributes little to the further liberalization 
of trade under its bilateral or regional free trade agreement, it may not necessarily be 
the most preferable from the standpoint of the overall purpose of trade liberalization.   
The analysis provided in this paper, which focuses on specific regulations of 
the respective safeguard mechanisms and investigates their trade-restrictiveness, is 
essential, but comprises only half of an overall analysis necessary for a complete and 
comprehensive understanding of the bilateral and regional safeguard mechanisms.   
 
                                                                                                                                                  
International Trade: Essays in Honor of W. M Corden, Oxford: Blackwell, 1987). 
However, these functions are not relevant in the context of our analysis since its 
purpose is to evaluate safeguard mechanisms in terms of the achievement of freer 
international trade and not the overall social welfare of their parties. Table 1: Indicators and Their Descriptions in Terms of the Global Safeguard Clause   
Indicators  Global Safeguard Clause (Safeguard Agreement), 
①  Criteria for injury 
  
“serious injury (Art.2.1)” defined as “a significant overall impairment in the position of a domestic 
industry (Art.4.1(a))” 
②  Criteria for threat of injury  “threat of serious injury” defined as “serious injury that is clearly imminent” whose determination “be 
based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility (Art. 4.2(b))” 
1 .Injury (threat of injury) 
 
③  Indicators for determination  “all relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing on the situation of that 
industry, in particular, the rate and amount of the increase in imports of the product concerned in 
absolute and relative terms, the share of domestic market taken by increased imports, changes in the 
level of sales, production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses, and employment 
(Art.4.2(a)) 
2. Increased Imports  Mode of increase  “absolute or relative to domestic production (Art.2.1)” 
①  Criteria for causation  no specific regulation    3. Causation 
②  Method for determination  non-attribution rule, stated as “when factors other than increased imports are causing injury to the 
domestic industry at the same time, such injury shall not be attributed to increased imports (Art.4.2(b))” 
①  Period of initial application  “4 years (Art.7.1)” 









Reference to the concept of 
“adjustment”  
In relation to the determination of the period of initial application (Art.7.1), the allowability of the 
extension (Art.7.2), and the purpose of the progressive liberalization of the initial measures (Art.7.4) 
6. Reapplication 
 
Interval for reapplication  “a period of time equal to that during which such measure had been previously applied, provided that 
the period of non-application is at least 2 years (Art 7.5)” 
7. Domestic Investigation  Mode of domestic investigation  “investigation shall include reasonable public notice to all interested parties and public hearings or 
other appropriate means in which importers, exporter and other interested parties could present 
evidence and their views (Art.3.1)” 
8. Notification and Consultation    Need  for  notification  and 
consultation 
notification to the Committee at initiation of investigation, finding of serious injury, and determination 
of application (Art.12.1)., consultation with affected parties prior to application (Art.12.3) 
9. Dispute Settlement Procedure  Applicability of neutral dispute 
settlement procedure 
applicable (Art.14) Table 2: Actual Regulations of the Selected Bilateral Safeguard Clauses (GSC stands for the provisions of the global safeguard clause described in Table 1) 
indicators  NAFTA  (1994)  EFTA  (1960,  amended  in  2001)  AFTA  (1993) 
1-①  GSC  “serious injury” 
1-②  GSC  “threat of serious injury” 
1-③ GSC＋”may also consider other economic factors, 
such as changes in prices and inventories, and the 
ability of firms in the industry to generate capital”
no specific regulation 
2 “in  absolute  terms”  no specific regulation 
3-①  “the imports of such good from that Party alone 
constitute a substantial cause” 
no specific regulation 
3-②  GSC 
 
“If serious economic, societal or environmental 
difficulties of a sectorial or regional nature 
liable to persisit are arising, a Member State 
may unilaterally take appropriate measures ”
 
 
no specific regulation 
4-①  “3 years”  no specific regulations  no specific regulation 
4-②  “1 year”  no specific regulation  no specific regulation 
4-③  no specific regulation  no specific regulation  no specific regulation 
5  as a condition for extension  no specific regulation  no reference 
6  not reapplicable    no specific regulation  no specific regulation 
7  more detailed than GSC, especially on the 
institution of a proceeding, the contents of a 
petition or complaint, and the notice requirement, 
determinations by investigating authority subject 
to review by judicial or administrative tribunals to 
the extent provided by domestic law 
no specific regulation 
 
no specific regulation 
8  notification to and consultation with the affected 
parties at institution of a proceeding that could 
result in emergency action 
notification and consultation in the Council 
prior to application, notification to the Council 
where measures a re taken, consultations in 
the Council every 3 month after their adaption
notification to the Council where measures are 
taken 
9  not  applicable  submission to the Council comprising the 
representatives from each Member State 
submission to the minister level Council 
comprising one nominee from each Member 
State and the Secretary-General of the 
ASEAN Secretariat, or the ASEAN Economic 
Minister (AEM)  
Selected Bilateral Safeguard Clauses   
indicators EC-Mexico  (2000)  US-Australia (2005)  Australia-New Zealand (1983) 
1-①  “serious injury”  GSC  “severe material injury” 
1-②  “threat of serious injury”  GSC  “an imminent and demonstrable threat” 
1-③  no specific regulation  GSC  no specific regulation 
2  no specific regulation  GSC  no specific regulation 
3-①  no specific regulation  “substantial cause” defined as “important and 
not less than another cause” 
no specific regulation 
3-②  no specific regulation  no specific regulation  no specific regulation 
4-①  “1 year”  “2 years”  “2 years” 
4-②  “a total maximum period of 3 years”  “2 years”  no specific regulation 
4-③  “shall contain clear elements progressively leading 
to their elimination at the end of the set period , at 
the latest” 
GSC  no specific regulation 
5  no  reference  as a restriction to the duration of initial 
application, and as a condition for extension 
no reference 
6  “3 years”  not reapplicable  no specific regulation 
7  no specific regulation  GSC  an opportunity for evidence to be presented from 
the other party be provided 
8  referral of the difficulties of the importing country 
for examination to the Joint Committee, which 
may take any decisions needed to put an end to 
such difficulties, notification to and consultation 
with the Joint Committee when measures are 
applied  
notification to the other party at initiation of 
investigation, consultation with the other 
party prior to application 
consultation with the other party to seek a 
mutually acceptable solution before 
investigation, at determining material injury, 
annual review with the other party of the need 
for the continuation of measures 
9 applicable  applicable  not  applicable  
Selected Bilateral Safeguard Clauses
indicators US-Singapore  (2004)  Japan-Mexico (2005)  Japan-Singapore (2002) 
1-①  GSC GSC  GSC 
1-②  GSC GSC  GSC 
1-③  GSC  GSC＋”prices”  GSC 
2  GSC  “in absolute terms”  “in absolute terms” 
3-①  “substantial cause” defined as “important and not 
less than another cause” 
“substantial  cause”    “the imports of that originating good alone 
constitute a substantial cause “ 
3-②  GSC GSC  GSC 
4-①  “2 years”  “3 years”  “1 year” 
4-②  “2 years”  “a total maximum period of 4 years”  “a total maximum of 3 years” 
4-③  GSC  “shall present the other party a schedule 
leading to its progressive elimination” 
no specific regulation 
5  as a restriction to the duration of initial 
application, and as a condition for extension 
as a restriction to the extent of a measure  as a restriction the duration of initial 
application 
6  not reapplicable  “a period of time equal to the duration of the 
previous measure or 1 year” 
not reapplicable 
7  GSC  more detailed than GSC, especially on the 
procedure and the content of public notice at 
initiation of investigation, and access of 
information related to investigation to 
interested parties   
GSC 
8  notification to the other party at initiation of 
investigation, consultation with the other party 
prior to application 
notification to the other party at initiation of 
investigation, and prior to application, 
consultation with the other party prior to 
application 
notification to the other party at initiation of 
investigation, finding of serious injury, and 
determination of application, consultation with 
the other party prior to application 
9 applicable  applicable  applicable   








indicators Korea-Chile  (2004)  Korea-Singapore (2005)  China-ASEAN (2003) 
1-①  GSC GSC 
1-②  GSC GSC 
1-③  GSC GSC 
2 GSC  GSC 
3-①  “substantial cause” defined as “important and 
not less than any other cause” 
GSC 
3-②  GSC GSC 
4-①  “2 years”  “3 years” 
4-②  “2 years”  “1 year” 
4-③  GSC GSC 
5  as a restriction to the duration of initial 
application, and as a condition for extension 
GSC 
6  no specific regulation  GSC 
7 GSC  GSC 
8  notification to the other party at initiation of 
investigation, consultation with the other 










no general bilateral safeguard clause 
 
applicable applicable Table 3: Generic Characterization of Respective Bilateral Safeguard Clause 
NAFTA  Very rigid and detailed substantial conditions, rigid and detailed procedural conditions, very detailed and extensive domestic 
investigation proceedings, neutral international dispute settlement procedure not available   
EFTA  Unique and extremely broad grounds for the invocation of measures, lax and nonspecific procedural conditions, no specific 
regulation on domestic investigation proceedings, dispute settlement procedure politically oriented. 
AFTA  Lax and nonspecific conditions both substantial and procedural, no specific regulation on domestic investigation proceedings, 
dispute settlement procedure politically oriented 
EU-Mexico  Lax and nonspecific substantial conditions, rigid and detailed procedural conditions, no specific regulations on domestic 
investigation proceedings, consultation prior to the application of measures, neutral dispute settlement procedure not available, 
“serious disturbances in any sector of the economy” and “difficulties which could bring about serious deterioration in the economic 
situation of a region of the importing country” as grounds for the invocation of measures 
US-Australia  Rigid and detailed conditions both substantial and formal, detailed domestic and international proceedings   
Australia-New 
Zealand 
Transitional character between GATT 19 and Safeguard Agreement, lax and nonspecific substantial conditions, relatively detailed 
procedural conditions, relatively detailed regulations on domestic investigation, pursuit of political solutions prior to application of 
the measures, annual review, neutral dispute settlement procedure not available   
US-Singapore  Similarity with Safeguard Agreement, rigid and detailed conditions both substantial and formal, detailed domestic and 
international proceedings   
Japan-Mexico  Similarity with Safeguard Agreement, rigid and detailed conditions both substantial and formal, very detailed domestic 
proceedings, detailed international proceedings 
Japan-Singapore  Similarity with Safeguard Agreement, very rigid and detailed conditions both substantial and formal, detailed domestic and 
international proceedings   
Korea-Chile  Safeguard measures not applicable on the products under the FTA 
Korea-Singapore  Similarity with Safeguard Agreement, rigid and detailed conditions both substantial and formal, detailed domestic and 
international  proceedings   
China-ASEAN  Great Similarity with Safeguard Agreement, general adoption of Safeguard Agreement regulations with few exceptions arising 




Table 4: Classification of the Selected Bilateral and Regional Safeguard Clauses 
 
1.  No General Safeguard Type 
No General Bilateral Safeguard Clause 
          Korea-Chile FTA 
 
2.  Quasi Global Safeguard Type 
(1)  WTO Type 
  Similarity with the Safeguard Agreement (rigid and detailed conditions, detailed domestic and international proceedings) 
          Japan-Singapore FTA, China-ASEAN FTA, Japan-Mexico FTA, US-Australia FTA, US-Singapore FTA, Korea-Singapore FTA 
 
(2) GATT Type 
Similarity with the GATT 19 (lax and non specific conditions, politically-governed implementation) 
          A F T A ,   A u s t r a l i a - N e w   Z e a l a n d   F T A  
 
(3) Transnational Type 
Implementation Secured through Detailed Domestic Investigation (rigid and detailed conditions, especially detailed and through domestic 
investigation, no neutral international dispute settlement) 
  NAFTA 
 
3.  European Type 
       Broader  Grounds  for  Invocation  (grounds  for  invocation  other than the normal “Injury to Domestic Industries” requirements) 
          E F T A ,   E U - M e x i c o   F T A  
 
    
                  